In a book and a series of articles Harold I. Brown has presented “the new theory of science”, which he characterizes as a “modest historicism”. I propose to examine Brown's contribution to the current debate on scientific method, and to show the inadequacy of his proposals. In particular, I want to concentrate on a fundamental concern of Brown's, namely, rationality.

The problem of the critical assessment of theories across paradigms raised by Kuhn is not resolved, it is argued, either by Scheffler's appeal to initial credibility or by Lakatos' conception of a research program. It is argued further that, in these contexts, the notion of reasonable choice by individuals makes no sense. The conclusion supports Feyerabend's position of "epistemological anarchism.".

The first set of case studies on animal use, this volume offers a thorough, up-to-date exploration of the moral issues related to animal welfare. Its main purpose is to examine how far it is ethically justifiable to harm animals in order to benefit mankind. An excellent introduction provides a framework for the cases and sets the background of philosophical and moral concepts underlying the subject. Sixteen original, previously unpublished essays cover controversies associated with the human use of animals in a (...) broad range of contexts, including biomedical, behavioral, and wildlife research, cosmetic safety testing, education, the food industry, commerce, and animal use as pets and in religious practices. Scientific research is accorded the closest scrutiny. The authors represent a wide range of expertise within their specialized areas of research--physiology, public policy, ethics, philosophy, law, veterinary science, and psychology. The careful analysis of each case makes it possible to elevate the discourse beyond over-simplified positions, and to demonstrate the complexity of the issues. The Human Use of Animals will be welcomed by students and faculty in law, philosophy, ethics, public policy, religion, medicine, and veterinary medicine. It will also interest activists in the animal protection movement, and members of animal protection organizations and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees. (shrink)

'Leading economists presenting fundamentally important issues in economic theory' is the theme of the Nancy Schwartz lectures series held annually at the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management of Northwestern University. Reporting on lectures delivered in the years 1983 through 1997, this collection of essays discusses economic behavior at the individual and group level and the implications to the performance of economic systems. Using non-technical language, the speakers present theoretical, experimental, and empirical analysis of decision making under uncertainty and (...) under full and bounded rationality, the influence of economic incentives and habits, and the effects of learning and evolution on dynamic choice. Perfect competition, economic development, social insurance and social mobility, and negotiation and economic survival, are major economic subjects analyzed through our understanding of economic behavior. (shrink)

Coral bleaching has impacted reefs worldwide and the predictions of near‐annual bleaching from over two decades ago have now been realized. While technology currently provides the means to predict large‐scale bleaching, predicting reef‐scale and within‐reef patterns in real‐time for all reef users is limited. In 2020, heat stress across the Great Barrier Reef underpinned the region's third bleaching event in 5 years. Here we review the heterogeneous emergence of bleaching across Heron Island reef habitats and discuss the oceanographic drivers that (...) underpinned variable bleaching emergence. We do so as a case study to highlight how reef end‐user groups who engage with coral reefs in different ways require targeted guidance for how, and when, to alter their use of coral reefs in response to bleaching events. Our case study of coral bleaching emergence demonstrates how within‐reef scale nowcasting of coral bleaching could aid the development of accessible and equitable bleaching response strategies on coral reefs. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/N9Tgb8N-vN0. (shrink)

William Connolly, one of the best-known and most important political theorists writing today, is a principal architect of the “new pluralism.” In this volume, leading thinkers in contemporary political theory and international relations provide a comprehensive investigation of the new pluralism, Connolly’s contributions to it, and its influence on the fields of political theory and international relations. Together they trace the evolution of Connolly’s ideas, illuminating his challenges to the “old,” conventional pluralist theory that dominated American and British political science (...) and sociology in the second half of the twentieth century. The contributors show how Connolly has continually revised his ideas about pluralism to take into account radical changes in global politics, incorporate new theories of cognition, and reflect on the centrality of religion in political conflict. They engage his arguments for an agonistic democracy in which all fundamentalisms become the objects of politicization, so that differences are not just tolerated but are productive of debate and the creative source of a politics of becoming. They also explore the implications of his work, often challenging his views to widen the reach of even his most recently developed theories. Connolly’s new pluralism will provoke all citizens who refuse to subordinate their thinking to the regimes in which they reside, to religious authorities tied to the state, or to corporate interests tied to either. _The New Pluralism_ concludes with an interview with Connolly in which he reflects on the evolution of his ideas and expands on his current work. _Contributors_: Roland Bleiker, Wendy Brown, David Campbell, William Connolly, James Der Derian, Thomas L. Dumm, Kathy E. Ferguson, Bonnie Honig, George Kateb, Morton Schoolman Michael J. Shapiro, Stephen K. White. (shrink)

a review of John Pollock's *Thinking about Acting* with a focus on his aim of describing psychological mechanisms which are humanly feasible.

In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie. In this paper, we do three things. First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument. Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony. Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument. We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral non-naturalism—the target of the argument from (...) queerness. (shrink)

Si l'on a pu dire que la philosophie analytique, sous l'influence du positivisme logique, a longtemps accordé un statut privilégié à la logique et aux sciences de la nature - parfois au point d'y réduire tout ce à quoi la philosophie peut légitimement prétendre -, il semble désormais que cette conception trop étroite doive laisser place à une étude globale des différentes institutions de la culture, étude dont Morton White entreprend ici la justification philosophique. A la lumière du holisme (...) scientifique de Duhem et de Quine, l'auteur renouvelle les approches de James, de Dewey et des autres représentants de cette grande tradition de la pensée américaine qu'est le pragmatisme. Il nous propose ainsi une véritable reconception de la philosophie dans ses rapports aux sciences et à la culture. (shrink)

Le déréglement climatique est sans doute l’exemple le plus dramatique d’« hyperobjet », à savoir d’entités de dimensions temporelles et spatiales si disproportionnées à nos habitudes de perception que nos cadres de pensée et de compréhension s’en trouvent déjoués. Cet article explique ce que sont les hyperobjets et évoque leur impact sur nos modes de pensée ainsi que sur les façons dont nous devons apprendre à coexister. Les hyperobjets nous forcent à prendre en compte l’inséparé.

It is in a way easier to imagine evil actions than we often suppose, but what it is thus relatively easy to do is not what we want to understand about evil. To argue for this conclusion I distin- guish between imagining why someone did something and imagining how they could have done it, and I try to grasp partial understanding, in part by distinguishing different imaginative pers- pectives we can have on an act. When we do this we see (...) an often unnoticed asymmetry: we do not put the same demands on our understanding of wrongdoing as on that of most everyday, morally acceptable, actions. (shrink)

Nach Morton White können wir die holistische Quine/Duhem-These auf ethische Sätze genauso anwenden wie auf wissenschaftliche. Demzufolge mögen sich die meisten ethische Sätze zwar nicht einzeln testen lassen, wohl aber im Zusammenhang einer kompletten Theorie, die sowohl deskriptive als auch normative Sätze enthält. Ich diskutiere zwei Vorschläge dafür, wie dieser Vergleich durchbuchstabiert werden könnte. Laut Whites eigenem Vorschlag lassen sich einige normative Konsequenzen des Gesamtsystems durch Konfrontation mit den emotionalen Reaktionen des Sprechers testen. Laut meinem Vorschlag sind einige normative (...) Konsequenzen des Systems bereits Beobachtungssätze in Quines Sinn und können genauso getestet werden wie naturwissenschaftliche Beobachtungssätze, nämlich durch Sinneserfahrung. Kurzum, es gibt moralische Beobachtungssätze. Quine bezeichnet diejenigen Sätze als Beobachtungssätze, die alle anwesenden Sprecher einer Gemeinschaft stets gleich beurteilen und die der einzelne Sprecher ausschließlich aufgrund momentaner Sinnesreizung bejaht oder verneint (also unabhängig von Hintergrund-Informationen). In Quines Argument gegen moralische Beobachtungssätze steckt folgender Fehler: Quine glaubt, dass sich moralische Fragen immer nur angesichts von Hintergrund-Informationen beurteilen lassen. Bei vielen moralischen Sätzen mag das so sein; aber es gibt Gegenbeispiele, in denen Hintergrund-Informationen ausgeschaltet sind, z.B. "Dies ist sichtbares Unrecht". (shrink)